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In the wake of the 2007-2008 financial crisis—the worst crisis in a generation—the 
effectiveness of regulation of international finance has been called into question. The global 
institutions which provide the international standards and rules for the world had also been 
profoundly undemocratic through their exclusion of developing countries. Following the crisis, 
and the Group of Twenty’s (G-20) reaction to it, significant reforms have taken place to include 
members from developing countries for the first time in regulatory financial bodies. In the 
following sections we will examine these reforms and suggest further improvements that would 
not only improve governance but also serve to make financial regulation more effective for the 
future. 
 
A critique of past governance 
 In the years leading up to the current global financial crisis, critique of the composition of 
global financial regulatory institutions was widespread. In 2002, the United Nations International 
Conference on Financing for Development produced what was known as the Monterrey 
Consensus. Among the many points agreed by over fifty Heads of State and two hundred 
Ministers of Finance, Foreign Affairs, Development and Trade was that the institutions of global 
financial governance such as the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), the Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision and the Financial Stability Forum should “…enhance their outreach and 
consultation with developing countries…” and should “…review their membership to allow for 
adequate participation of developing countries.” The lack of developing country representation 
had before and since been critiqued extensively by various academics and NGOs around the 
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world. While the BIS expanded its membership somewhat,1 institutions such as the Financial 
Stability Forum (FSF) and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) continued till 
recently to exclude any formal participation from developing countries.  
Because of the BCBS’s important and authoritative role in setting the international 
banking standards for the world, it received the lion’s share of the critique. Networks of 
academics and NGOs also advocated for the reform of the international regulatory institutions 
more widely. The Committee’s exclusion of developing countries, it was pointed out, distorted 
and biased the policies designed, making them both ineffective in general and contrary to the 
interests of the developing world.2 Even the former Director of the UK Financial Stability 
Authority, Howard Davies, pointed out that many countries with large financial sectors 
(including developing countries) were then not members of the Basel Committee, and argued 
that membership should be revised.3   
Problems Generated by the Old System 
Deficiencies in the governance of the international financial regulatory institutions 
generated a number of weaknesses in regulation. While the system of informal information 
sharing, coordination and communication witnessed some advances, the formal regulatory 
policies pursued were inadequate. There was a strong set of incentives to promote the financial 
services sector that competed with the focus to manage risks within it. Especially countries such 
as the US and UK with extensive and sophisticated financial sectors had an incentive to protect 
their booming and profitable financial sectors. By under-regulating, systemic risk was allowed to 
build up. Many of the approaches taken, such as the drive toward quantitative, model-driven, and 
fundamentally microeconomic approaches to risk reflected a confidence that large banks could 
measure risk parameters themselves. Several major developing countries were much more 
skeptical of such approaches, their feasibility and effectiveness, and were fearful of the pro-
cyclical dimensions of the regulations developed (i.e. their capacity to exacerbate swings in the 
                                                           
1
 Not only did the BIS expand its central bank membership, in 2006 it also included central bank governors from 
developing countries (Mexico and China) on its Board of Directors.  
2
 See  for example Stephany Griffith-Jones and Avinash Persaud, “The Pro-cyclical Impact of Basle II on Emerging 
Markets and its Political Economy” in Joseph Stiglitz and José Antonio Ocampo (Eds.), Capital Market 
Liberalization and Development (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
3
 See Howard Davies, “A Review of the Review”, Financial Markets, Institutions & Instruments Vol. 14, No. 5 
(December 2005), pp. 247-252.  
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economic cycle). Had they been allowed a seat at the BCBS table, their positions might have 
improved decision making and policy design. 
 
Recent Reforms: Important Steps in the Right Direction 
In the midst of the recent global financial crisis, there have finally been significant 
expansions of the memberships of global financial regulatory institutions. These reforms 
demonstrate that with constructive suggestions, global financial regulatory institutions can be 
pressured to reform their memberships.4 In the context of a major crisis in the core countries, the 
collaboration of developing countries is needed to resolve the dilemmas of both legitimacy and 
effectiveness of these institutions. Following the Washington G-20 Summit in November 2008, 
which encouraged the international financial standard setting bodies to review their governance, 
a number of important institutions expanded their memberships, particularly to developing and 
emerging countries. Table 1 summarizes these changes in the public regulatory institutions.  












Expansion to Include 
Members from: 
IOSCO Australia, France, Germany, Hong 
Kong, Italy, Japan, Mexico, 
Netherlands, Canada, Spain, 
Switzerland, UK, USA. 
Mexico February 
2009 
Brazil, India, China 
 
BCBS Belgium, Canada, France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxemburg, 
Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland, 




Australia, Brazil, China, 
India, Korea, Mexico, and 
Russia. 
FSF/B Australia, Canada, France, 
Germany, Hong Kong, Italy, Japan, 
Netherlands, Singapore, 
Switzerland, UK, USA. 
None March 
2009 
Argentina, Brazil, China, 
India, South Korea, Mexico, 
Russia, Saudi Arabia, 
Turkey, Spain, European 
Commission 
 
Early in 2009, the Technical Committee of the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions Organization (IOSCO), which before had no developing country members aside 
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 See David Held and Kevin Young, “Global Financial Governance: Principles for Reform” LSE Ideas: Special 
Report on the Financial Crisis (London: London School of Economics and Political Science, March 2009) pp. 13-
18. 
 IPD and Hewlett Policy Brief
from Mexico, expanded its membership to include Brazil, India, and China.5 In March 2009, 
approaching the deadline set by the G-20 for reform, two more expansions occurred. Firstly the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision expanded its membership to include developing 
countries for the first time, adding Brazil, China, India, South Korea, and Mexico in addition to 
Australia and Russia. As Figure 1 illustrates below, this closed a remarkably large gap in the 
degree of representation in the Committee in terms of the countries which supervise the largest 
fifty banks in the world. However, countries with relatively smaller banks are still not adequately 
represented, which means that banking regulation may continue to reflect excessively the 
interests of large banks. Secondly, shortly thereafter, the Financial Stability Forum increased its 
membership to include the entire G-20, plus Spain and the European Commission, and has since 
been renamed the Financial Stability Board, to reflect that it would be given additional powers. 
This expansion of membership was also significant, as shown by Figures 2 and 3 below which 
illustrate that, measured both in terms of world reserves and world savings, the Financial 
Stability Board now has much more equitable representation than its predecessor.  
 
Figure 1: Percentage of Top Fifty Banks (by Market Capitalization) with Regulators 
Represented in the Basel Committee, March and April 2009 
 
    
 
                                                           
5
 Private international standard-setting bodies such as the International Accounting Standards Board also expanded 
their membership, committing to an expansion from 14 to 16 members, and guaranteed some greater geographical 
diversity on their Board. 
 Before BCBS Expansion After BCBS Expansion 
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The above mentioned changes amount to a highly significant expansion of representativeness 
within the global financial regulatory institutions. For the first time, there is a degree of inclusion 
of developing and emerging countries in the major decision-making bodies of international 
financial regulation. Despite the enhancement of representativeness, broader governance issues 
remain, which we discuss below, and make proposals for further reform. 
                                                           
6
 Values of gross domestic savings are only available for end-2005; they represent gross domestic savings in US 
dollars. Source: World Bank World Development Indicators. 
7
 Values, for total reserves in US dollars, and exclude Gold holdings, from end 2007. Source: World Bank World 
Development Indicators. 
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Proposals for Improving Governance for the Future 
It is very welcome that, finally, there has been a significant increase in the participation 
of developing countries in the governance of international regulatory bodies. This should 
enhance their legitimacy and representativeness as financial market regulation is finally 
acknowledged as a global public good which requires global stakeholders to design it. It should 
also improve their effectiveness, as greater diversity of views—reflecting different 
experiences—can lead to better outcomes. Most importantly, it will allow the concerns of a 
diversity of developing countries to be better reflected in international regulatory arrangements. 
Despite these important steps, a number of other improvements could further enhance the 
legitimacy and effectiveness of the newly reformed institutions. We propose below five further 
improvements to the system of global financial regulatory governance that should be made: 
1) Small and medium countries should have some representation in international regulatory 
bodies. This will firstly ensure that their concerns (e.g. of simpler regulations, as well as 
of ensuring greater regulatory power of smaller countries over large international banks, 
via for example host country regulations) are heard. Secondly, since in many of these 
countries the financial sector is relatively smaller, their financial regulators may be more 
functionally independent and less at risk of capture by financial interests. Finally, 
regulation would reflect less exclusively the interests and preferences of large banks, and 
be more appropriate for regulating smaller banks. Small and medium countries could be 
represented in international regulatory bodies on a rotating basis, for example, based on 
three regions (e.g. Asia, Africa and Middle East, as well as Latin America and the 
Caribbean). 
 
2) Attempts could be made to include some forms of representation from non-financial 
stakeholders, such as unions, and non-financial corporations in international, as well as 
national, financial regulatory bodies. This would help balance their concerns, needs and 
perspectives (focused on sustained growth, employment, and long term financial 
stability) with those of the financial industry which are more unilaterally focused on 
short-term financial profits.  
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3) Financial regulatory bodies should be made accountable to established forms of political 
representation. This may include some system of accountability to national parliaments 
by national regulators and, reflecting international financial interdependence and 
globalization, and should include accountability of international regulatory bodies to 
multilateral democratic institutions such as the United Nations.  
 
4) Given that some developing countries now for the first time have a place in key 
international regulatory bodies such as the FSF/B and the BCBS, it seems desirable to 
have a technical secretariat created by developing countries to serve them. This 
secretariat could prepare or commission studies, provide a forum for debate amongst 
developing countries and help—where relevant—to define developing country positions 
on regulatory issues and needs, especially those that require international and/or 
developed country action. Measures to introduce some international regulation of the 
carry trade might be an example of this. Developing countries have benefited greatly 
from the support of the Group of 24 (G-24), which helps them develop their positions in 
relation to IMF and World Bank matters; a similar body, possibly linked to the G-24, 
could be created for international regulatory issues, to help develop developing country 
positions at the FSF/B, BCBS, and other relevant bodies. 
 
5) The design and creation of a global financial regulator is one of the main institutional 
challenges that the international community faces after the global financial crisis. Such an 
institutional structure would be consistent with the fact that capital and banking markets 
have very large parts that operate at a global level. For the domain of the market to be 
consistent with the domain of the regulator, and thus avoid regulatory arbitrage between 
countries and financial centers, it is a highly desirable option to work toward. By pooling 
and sharing their power internationally regulators would be increasing their joint control 
over global financial markets, so those can better serve public policy goals. This would 
help to make costly financial crises less likely in the future, when financial markets are 
sure to be even more global, more sophisticated, and even more difficult to contain and 
regulate than today.  
